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dc.contributor.authorHutto, D.
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-20T08:45:43Z
dc.date.available2011-06-20T08:45:43Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.citationIn : Radical Enactivism : Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative; Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, edited by Menary, R., pp.157-177en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-9027241511
dc.identifier.isbn9027241511
dc.identifier.other103303
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/6013
dc.descriptionFull text of this chapter is not available in the UHRAen_US
dc.description.abstractAlthough he is generally sympathetic to my larger programme, Goldie- like Myin, De Nul and Crane – holds that my attempt to expose the philosophical damage caused by a misguided commitment to the object-based schema fails to get to the root of problem: i.e. the real impediment to our understanding of the emotions. He says what we want is “a positive account that entails the rejection of any kind of how-it-works account” (Goldie: this volume). It is not enough simply to have a “posiviitve account that entails the rejection of an object-based schema” (Goldie: this volume). This is because, as he sees it, the desire to provide how-it-works accounts – and not merely those of the kind that model experience on ‘objects’ per se – is the true source of our tendency to misunderstand emotional experience.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Companyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesConsciousness and Emotion Book Series;
dc.titleEmbodied expectations and extended possibilities : reply to Goldie.en_US
dc.typeBook chapteren_US
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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