| dc.contributor.author | Hutto, D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-20T08:47:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-20T08:47:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | In : Radical Enactivism : Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative; Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, edited by Menary, R., pp.13-38 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-9027241511 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 9027241511 | |
| dc.identifier.other | 905531 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/6014 | |
| dc.description | Full text of this book is not available in the UHRA | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Philosophically speaking, emotions are a nuisance, even the good ones. There are several reasons for this. First, it is thought that they are a hangover of our animal natures that interfere with our rationality : they gum up our reasoning. This verdict has been familiar since the time of Greek philosophy, which is no doubt why being a cognitive scientists appears a respectable occupation, but being an ‘emotive scientist’ sounds like a blemish on one’s capacity for professional judgement. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Consciousness and Emotion Book Series; | |
| dc.title | Unprincipled engagements : emotional experience, expression and response. | en_US |
| dc.type | Book chapter | en_US |
| herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |
