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dc.contributor.authorSaha, B.
dc.contributor.authorSensarma, R.
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-03T12:01:11Z
dc.date.available2011-11-03T12:01:11Z
dc.date.issued2011-10-01
dc.identifier.citationSaha , B & Sensarma , R 2011 , ' Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition ' , Bulletin of Economic Research , vol. 63 , no. 4 , pp. 385-403 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x
dc.identifier.issn0307-3378
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 439362
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 68712dfb-da5c-4e99-bd81-7a52110a8579
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 80053235357
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/6892
dc.descriptionThe definitive version can be found at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ Copyright 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research Copyright 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.
dc.description.abstractWe consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit-linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit-linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.en
dc.format.extent19
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofBulletin of Economic Research
dc.subjectbanking
dc.subjectmanagerial incentive
dc.subjectmixed duopoly
dc.subjectnationalization
dc.subjectprivatization
dc.subjectG21
dc.subjectL13
dc.subjectL33
dc.titleMixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competitionen
dc.contributor.institutionDepartment of Accounting, Finance and Economics
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.date.embargoedUntil2013-10-01
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80053235357&partnerID=8YFLogxK
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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