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dc.contributor.authorCoates, Paul
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-16T13:01:05Z
dc.date.available2012-01-16T13:01:05Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationCoates , P 2009 , ' The Multiple Contents of Experience : Representation and the Awareness of Phenomenal Qualities ' , Philosophical Topics , vol. 37 , no. 1 , pp. 25-47 .
dc.identifier.issn0276-2080
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/7655
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the contents of perceptual experience, and focuses in particular on the relation between the representational aspects of an experience and its phenomenal character. It is argued that the Critical Realist two-component analysis of experience, advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, is preferable to the Intentionalist view. Experiences have different kinds of representational contents: both informational and intentional. An understanding of the essential navigational role of perception provides a principled way of explaining the nature of such representational contents. Experiences also have a distinct phenomenal content, or character, which is not determined by representational content.en
dc.format.extent23
dc.format.extent374032
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Topics
dc.subjectPerceptual experience; perceptual content; critical realism; phenomenal qualities; representation; intentionalism; causal theory of perception; navigational account; Wilfrid Sellars;
dc.titleThe Multiple Contents of Experience : Representation and the Awareness of Phenomenal Qualitiesen
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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