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dc.contributor.authorHutto, D.
dc.contributor.editorGarvey, J.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-07T14:00:17Z
dc.date.available2012-03-07T14:00:17Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationHutto , D 2011 , Consiousness . in J Garvey (ed.) , The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind . Continuum , pp. 35-53 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 187758
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 1cc405b8-6759-42cd-a6f0-5293b41b901b
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/5956
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/7918
dc.descriptionOriginal book can be found at : http://books.google.com/ Copyright Continuum Publishing Corporation [Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA]
dc.description.abstractThere is no utterly clean, clear and neutral account of what exactly is covered by the concept of consciousness. The situation reflects, and is exacerbated by the fact that we speak of consciousness in many different ways in ordinary parlance. A consequence of our multifarious uses of the concept is that it has proved impossible to define its essential characteristics through conceptual analysis. We have nothing approaching a descriptively adequate philosophical consensus of what lies at the core of all and every form of consciousness in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that would be accepted by all interested parties.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherContinuum
dc.relation.ispartofThe Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind
dc.rightsOpen
dc.titleConsiousnessen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dcterms.dateAccepted2011
rioxxterms.typeOther
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue
herts.rights.accesstypeOpen


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