dc.contributor.author | Gallagher, Shaun | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-21T13:56:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-05-21T13:56:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-07-01 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Gallagher , S 2008 , ' Are minimal representations still representations? ' , International Journal of Philosophical Studies , vol. 16 , no. 3 , pp. 351-69 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550802113243 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0967-2559 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/8534 | |
dc.description.abstract | I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism regarding the concept of representation. | en |
dc.format.extent | 20 | |
dc.format.extent | 168295 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Journal of Philosophical Studies | |
dc.subject | action | |
dc.subject | action oriented representation | |
dc.subject | decoupleability | |
dc.subject | pre-intentional act | |
dc.subject | dynamic systems | |
dc.title | Are minimal representations still representations? | en |
dc.contributor.institution | School of Humanities | |
dc.contributor.institution | Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute | |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
rioxxterms.versionofrecord | 10.1080/09672550802113243 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |