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dc.contributor.authorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.contributor.editorMoyal-Sharrock, Daniele
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T17:01:12Z
dc.date.available2012-06-12T17:01:12Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationMoyal-Sharrock , D 2007 , Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty . in D Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) , Perspicuous Presentations : Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology . Palgrave Macmillan , pp. 211-35 .
dc.identifier.isbn0230527485
dc.identifier.isbn978-0230527485
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 639224
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 52e6b00f-4da2-4489-ae37-6f25d033c46e
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/8719
dc.description.abstractAs is well-known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the latter, unlike the former, involve observation or a claim to knowledge, and are therefore constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry by challenging the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological sentences, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately also did. There are cases where third-person psychological ascriptions are not susceptible of error.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillan
dc.relation.ispartofPerspicuous Presentations
dc.subjectwittgenstein, philosophy of psychology
dc.titleWittgenstein on Psychological Certaintyen
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dcterms.dateAccepted2007
rioxxterms.typeOther
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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