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dc.contributor.authorFloridi, L.
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-08T16:29:08Z
dc.date.available2013-01-08T16:29:08Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationFloridi , L 2011 , ' A defence of constructionism : philosophy as conceptual engineering ' , Metaphilosophy , vol. 42 , no. 3 , pp. 282-304 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01693.x
dc.identifier.issn0026-1068
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 183287
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 613b68e9-215e-4473-97b4-15c8190d3ad5
dc.identifier.otherdspace: 2299/5773
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 79953830589
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/9509
dc.descriptionThe definitive version can be found at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ Copyright Wiley-Blackwell [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
dc.description.abstractThis article offers an account and defence of constructionism, both as a metaphilosophical approach and as a philosophical methodology, with references to the so-called maker's knowledge tradition. Its main thesis is that Plato's "user's knowledge" tradition should be complemented, if not replaced, by a constructionist approach to philosophical problems in general and to knowledge in particular. Epistemic agents know something when they are able to build (reproduce, simulate, model, construct, etc.) that something and plug the obtained information into the correct network of relations that account for it. Their epistemic expertise increases with the scope and depth of the questions that they are able to ask and answer. Thus, constructionism deprioritises mimetic, passive, and declarative knowledge that something is the case, in favour of poietic, interactive, and practical knowledge of something being the case. Metaphilosophically, constructionism suggests adding conceptual engineering to conceptual analysis as a fundamental method.en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofMetaphilosophy
dc.subjectconstructionism
dc.subjectconstructivism
dc.subjectepistemology
dc.subjectlevels of abstraction
dc.subjectminimalism
dc.subjectphilosophy of information
dc.titleA defence of constructionism : philosophy as conceptual engineeringen
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
dcterms.dateAccepted2011
rioxxterms.versionVoR
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01693.x
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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