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dc.contributor.authorStokes, Patrick
dc.identifier.citationStokes , P 2012 , ' Is narrative identity four-dimensionalist? ' , European Journal of Philosophy , vol. 20 , no. S1 , pp. E86-E106 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 511148
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 004d1f1e-8185-4df0-ab41-8e882e3277da
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84861747409
dc.description.abstractThe claim that selves are narratively constituted has attained considerable currency in both analytic and continental philosophy. However, a set of increasingly standard objections to narrative identity are also emerging. In this paper, I focus on metaphysically realist versions of narrative identity theory, showing how they both build on and differ from their neo-Lockean counterparts. But I also argue that narrative realism is implicitly committed to a four-dimensionalist, temporal-parts ontology of persons. That exposes narrative realism to the charge that the narratively constituted self, on the one hand, and the self that is the object of much of our everyday self-reference and self-experience, on the other, can't be the same thing. This conclusion may well force narrativists to abandon metaphysical realism about narrative selves—which, in turn, may leave the invocation of ‘narrativity’ as identity-constituting somewhat under-motivated.en
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Philosophy
dc.titleIs narrative identity four-dimensionalist?en
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
dc.relation.schoolSchool of Humanities
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review

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