dc.contributor.author | Goff, Philip | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-06T13:00:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-02-06T13:00:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-06 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Goff , P 2012 , ' A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubt ' , Consciousness and cognition , vol. 21 , no. 2 , pp. 742-746 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1053-8100 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/9920 | |
dc.description.abstract | A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | en |
dc.format.extent | 5 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Consciousness and cognition | |
dc.title | A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubt | en |
dc.contributor.institution | Philosophy | |
dc.contributor.institution | School of Humanities | |
dc.contributor.institution | Social Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | |
rioxxterms.versionofrecord | 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |