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dc.contributor.authorGoff, Philip
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-06T13:00:04Z
dc.date.available2013-02-06T13:00:04Z
dc.date.issued2012-06
dc.identifier.citationGoff , P 2012 , ' A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubt ' , Consciousness and cognition , vol. 21 , no. 2 , pp. 742-746 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007
dc.identifier.issn1053-8100
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 921501
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 95bd03d8-599e-458b-b9e5-1d089009b552
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000304336600033
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84860540086
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/9920
dc.description.abstractA zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en
dc.format.extent5
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofConsciousness and cognition
dc.titleA priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and cartesian doubten
dc.contributor.institutionPhilosophy
dc.contributor.institutionSchool of Humanities
dc.contributor.institutionSocial Sciences, Arts & Humanities Research Institute
dc.description.statusPeer reviewed
rioxxterms.versionofrecordhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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