Too Cavellian a Wittgenstein : Wittgenstein's Certainty, Cavell's Scepticism
My aim in this chapter is to show that Cavell's modernist Wittgenstein is too Cavellian. Wittgenstein's philosophy is not – as Cavell claims it is – permeated with (1) a nostalgia for metaphysics; (2) a dissatisfaction with language and criteria; (3) an ineluctable scepticism; all prompting (4) Existential devastation and angst. I will conclude that Cavell reads his own preoccupations into Wittgenstein and that this prevents him from seeing that Wittgenstein's certainty logically dismisses scepticism. Cavell's Wittgenstein is still a groundbreaking philosopher, but seen through Cavell's modernist glass darkly, his philosophy breeds disappointment, alienation and scepticism where it, in fact, sows enlightenment, community and certainty.
Item Type | Book Section |
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Additional information | Daniel Moyal-Sharrock, 'Too Cavellian a Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein's Certainty, Cavell's Scepticism', in Matar, A. Ed., Wittgenstein and Modernism, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, ISBN 9781501302442. |
Keywords | wittgenstein, cavell, ordinary language, scepticism, certainty, acknowledgement, modernism |
Date Deposited | 15 May 2025 16:37 |
Last Modified | 30 May 2025 23:15 |
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