The Animal in Epistemology : Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress
Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele
(2016)
The Animal in Epistemology : Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress.
In:
Hinge Epistemology :.
Brill Academic Publishers, p. 24.
ISBN 9789004332379
In this paper I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein's 'hinge certainties', showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'. As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Crispin Wright.
Item Type | Book Section |
---|---|
Additional information | Chapter in Hinge Epistemology, Coliva A. and Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2016, Leiden: Brill, ISBN: 9789004332379 |
Keywords | wittgenstein, epistemology, certainty, scepticism |
Date Deposited | 15 May 2025 16:38 |
Last Modified | 30 May 2025 23:16 |
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