Quand les mots sont des actes : les 'énoncés spontanés'chez Wittgenstein et la dissolution du problème corps-esprit' When words are deedsWittgenstein's 'spontaneous utterances and the dissolution of the mind-body problem

Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele (2005) Quand les mots sont des actes : les 'énoncés spontanés'chez Wittgenstein et la dissolution du problème corps-esprit' When words are deedsWittgenstein's 'spontaneous utterances and the dissolution of the mind-body problem. Revue de theologie et de philosophie. pp. 1-17.
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According to Wittgenstein, our spontaneous utterances are not descriptions, but expressions more akin to behaviour than to language: a new sort of speech-act. Rather than conventional performatory words, spontaneous utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new dimension of reflex, which, as I argue against Peter Hacker, makes the boundary porous between the categories of language and of action, thus dissolving the gap between mind and body

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