Moral particularism and scientific practice

Larvor, B. (2008) Moral particularism and scientific practice. Metaphilosophy, 39 (5). pp. 492-507. ISSN 0026-1068
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Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons.


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