Determining the Mental-to-Physical Relationship

Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same as that between red and scarlet: one of determinable property to determinate property. So just as being scarlet is a specific way of being red, on Yablo's proposal a subject's having a certain neurological property (c-fibres firing, say) is a specific way of a subject's having a certain mental property (pain, in this case). I explain the virtues of this theory, in particular as defended and developed by Jessica Wilson, but raise some problems for it. I then describe a novel theory of the mental/physical relationship, which inverts the Yablo-Wilson proposal. On this theory mental properties, notably phenomenal properties - or, as I will say, qualia - are determinates of determinable physical properties. I explain the virtues of this view, and argue that they at least match, and plausibly exceed, those of the Yablo-Wilson theory. In particular, this new theory is able to account for certain prominent perplexities of the mind/body problem that tend to go unexplained. I distinguish the view from nearby theories, in particular the increasingly popular 'Russellian monism'. I end by likening it to a recent interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind due to David Charles.