Of the Perception of Colours: Margaret Cavendish on Transparency
Margaret Cavendish, an early modern philosopher, argues that it is impossible to conceive of a colourless body. Transparent bodies, such as windows, transparent stones, and rarefied air, appear to challenge this claim since they are commonly understood to lack colour. I argue that this apparent tension is resolved through a previously unrecognised use of rational perception in Cavendish’s natural philosophy. In her mature philosophical works, Cavendish develops a vitalist materialism according to which all matter is self-moving and perceptive. On this account, she distinguishes between two types of perception: sensitive perception and rational perception. Sensitive perception occurs when the sensitive matter of the sense organs patterns the figure of an external object presented to it, whereas rational perception occurs when rational matter patterns the motions of sensitive matter. Deborah Boyle has argued that there is also a broader use of rational perception, whereby “the ‘rational parts’ [figure] themselves in ways that pertain to an external object but do not copy any occurrent motions of the sensitive matter,” including “remembering, conceiving, imagining, supposing, understanding, reasoning, opining, musing, and other like mental states” (Deborah Boyle 2015, 440). I argue that, given Cavendish claims that “matter, colour, figure, magnitude, etc. are but one thing” (OEP, 176), transparency must, in her natural philosophy, be understood as a colour. However, the corporeal figurative motions constituting this colour are “too subtle, rare, or little” (OEP, 82) to be distinctly perceived by the human eye through sensitive perception. Cavendish therefore maintains that “there are some objects which are not at all perceptible by any of our exterior senses… yet they are subject to our rational perception” (OEP, 47). By examining Cavendish’s account of rational perception, I argue that her texts reveal a third use of rational perception. Although transparency appears colourless to the optic sense, rational perception does not infer from this appearance that transparent bodies genuinely lack colour. Rather, it recognises that transparent bodies, like all natural bodies, are constituted by corporeal figurative motions from which colour necessarily arises.
| Item Type | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Identification Number | 10.18745/00027556 |
| Keywords | Margaret Cavendish; Materialism; Vitalism; Perception; Sensitive Perception; Rational Perception; Colour; Transparency; Metaphysics; Epistemology; Early Modern Philosophy; Mechanism |
| Date Deposited | 18 Nov 2026 08:54 |
| Last Modified | 18 Nov 2026 08:55 |
