Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition
Saha, B. and Sensarma, R.
(2011)
Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 63 (4).
pp. 385-403.
ISSN 0307-3378
We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit-linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit-linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.
Item Type | Article |
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Additional information | The definitive version can be found at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ Copyright 2010 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research Copyright 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research. |
Keywords | banking, managerial incentive, mixed duopoly, nationalization, privatization, g21, l13, l33 |
Date Deposited | 15 May 2025 12:16 |
Last Modified | 04 Jun 2025 17:02 |
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