dc.contributor.author | Austin, David John Joseph | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-19T14:07:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-19T14:07:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-08-19 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2299/16315 | |
dc.description.abstract | It is widely assumed that in order to lie, a speaker must at least assert a falsehood. I offer an analysis of lying based on the Gricean notion of communicative-intention and show how lying through assertion operates. I show that certain recently developed assertion-based accounts of lying are either problematic or at least not compelling. In defending an account of lying based on communicative-intention, I show how it is possible to lie in ways which do not involve assertion and how better to accommodate certain problematic cases than competing accounts. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Grice | en_US |
dc.subject | Assertion | en_US |
dc.subject | Implicature | en_US |
dc.subject | communicative-intention | en_US |
dc.subject | lies | en_US |
dc.title | Lying: A Gricean Account | en_US |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18745/th.16315 | |
dc.type.qualificationlevel | Masters | en_US |
dc.type.qualificationname | MA | en_US |
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessed | true | |