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dc.contributor.authorAustin, David John Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-19T14:07:02Z
dc.date.available2015-08-19T14:07:02Z
dc.date.issued2015-08-19
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2299/16315
dc.description.abstractIt is widely assumed that in order to lie, a speaker must at least assert a falsehood. I offer an analysis of lying based on the Gricean notion of communicative-intention and show how lying through assertion operates. I show that certain recently developed assertion-based accounts of lying are either problematic or at least not compelling. In defending an account of lying based on communicative-intention, I show how it is possible to lie in ways which do not involve assertion and how better to accommodate certain problematic cases than competing accounts.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectGriceen_US
dc.subjectAssertionen_US
dc.subjectImplicatureen_US
dc.subjectcommunicative-intentionen_US
dc.subjectliesen_US
dc.titleLying: A Gricean Accounten_US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.18745/th.16315
dc.type.qualificationlevelMastersen_US
dc.type.qualificationnameMAen_US
herts.preservation.rarelyaccessedtrue


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