Multi-Attribute Physical-Layer Authentication Against Jamming and Battery-Depletion Attacks in LoRaWAN

LoRaWAN is widely used for IoT environmental monitoring, but its lightweight security mechanisms leave the physical layer vulnerable to availability attacks such as jamming and battery-depletion. These risks are particularly critical in mission-critical environmental monitoring systems. This paper proposes a multi-attribute physical-layer authentication (PLA) framework that supports uplink legitimacy assessment by jointly exploiting radio, energy, and temporal attributes, specifically RSSI, altitude, battery_level, battery_drop_speed, event_step, and time_rank. Using publicly available Brno LoRaWAN traces, we construct a device-aware semi-synthetic dataset comprising 230,296 records from 1921 devices over 13.68 days, augmented with energy, spatial, and temporal attributes and injected with controlled jamming and battery-depletion anomalies. Five classifiers (Random Forest, Multi-Layer Perceptron, XGBoost, Logistic Regression, and K-Nearest Neighbours) are evaluated using accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and AUC-ROC. The Multi-Layer Perceptron achieves the strongest detection performance (F1-score = 0.8260, AUC-ROC = 0.8953), with Random Forest performing comparably. Deployment-oriented computational profiling shows that lightweight models such as Logistic Regression and the MLP achieve near-instantaneous prediction latency (below 2 μs per sample) with minimal CPU overhead, while tree-based models incur higher training and storage costs but remain feasible for Network Server-side deployment.