Credit market structure and bank screening : an indirect test on Italian data

Agostino, M., Gagliardi, F. and Trivieri, F. (2010) Credit market structure and bank screening : an indirect test on Italian data. Review of Financial Economics, 19 (4). pp. 151-160. ISSN 1058-3300
Copy

Based on a large panel of Italian SMEs, this paper focuses on the relationship between firms' default probability and the amount of bank debt they obtain, evaluating whether and to what extent this link is affected by the degree of competition characterizing the local credit market where firms operate. Using a dynamic panel estimator, we find that higher bank competition implies a stronger influence of firms' riskiness on bank financing to SMEs. We provide two plausible interpretations of this finding: one resorting to more accurate screening by more competitive banks; the other alleging lower market power of incumbent banks, which may restrict their willingness to finance riskier firms.


picture_as_pdf
904174.pdf

View Download
visibility_off picture_as_pdf

Published Version
lock

Atom BibTeX OpenURL ContextObject in Span OpenURL ContextObject Dublin Core MPEG-21 DIDL Data Cite XML EndNote HTML Citation METS MODS RIOXX2 XML Reference Manager Refer ASCII Citation
Export

Downloads